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PASCAL WAS No FIDEIST 
. .. 
DAVID BAGGETT 
In the context of discussing the philosophy of religion generalIy and natural 
theology particularly, Elliott Sober, in his Core Questions in Philosophy, devotes a 
lecture to Blaise Pascal. Pascal, the brilliant seventeenth-century French 
philosopher and mathematician, died at thirty-nine, not having completed his 
book in progress. The work was to be a Christian apologetic, a rational defense 
of the faith. What we have in the Pensees is a COlIection of notes that Pascal had 
been intending to use to write the book that was not completed before Pascal's 
premature death. Nonetheless, a careful reading of these remarkable notes 
reveals a thinker deeply engaged in questions concerning the human condition. 
They canvass evidence for the faith, the nature of rationality, and the limits of 
reason. The Pensees is a classic, yet nothing more than a COlIection of notes for 
the book Pascal never finished. One can only imagine what the final result might 
have looked like. 
Sober's generally excellent and widely popular introductory text on 
philosophy is used in countless beginning philosophy courses, and so his 
treatment of Pascal is perhaps the only exposure to this brilIiant thinker that 
many colIege students wilI ever have. It is therefore discouraging to see that, 
despite Pascal's impeccable credentials as a Christian philosopher and religious 
thinker, Sober's treatment of Pascal is summarized in a chapter entitled "Pascal 
and Irrationality." Sober begins the chapter by writing that Pascal was interested 
in the question of whether it could be rational to believe in God even if one 
thinks that it is enormously improbable that God exists. Admittedly, Pascal's 
Wager may have an implication pertaining to that question, but that is little 
evidence to believe that this indeed was an issue Pascal was much interested in. 
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What makes it unlikely that this was Pascal's concern is that Pascal surely did not 
think that the preponderance of evidence weighed against the specifically Christian or 
generally theistic hypothesis. To the (unlikely) extent that Pascal was concerned with 
such a question, he was entertaining what he considered a quite imaginary 
hypothetical. Sober neglects to mention this. Indeed, to the contrary, he adds to the 
misimpression that Pascal himself may have considered the religious hypothesis in 
question to be without evidential support, and he does so in a few ways. He casts 
Pascal as advancing only the Wager: a purely prudential and non-evidential argument 
for believing that Cod exists. Believe in Cod or else' Sober treats the Wager merely as 
a threat that would retain its force even in the absence of any evidence for the theistic 
hypothesis. ' He makes no mention of any other philosophical contributions in Pascal's 
thought or the Pensees. Readers of Sober unfamiliar with Pascal would naturally be led 
to believe that Pascal's sole contribution is the Wager. Since the Wager potentially works 
even if no evidence for Cod's existence can be adduced at all, Sober takes this to mean 
that Pascal's intention was to underscore that particular implication of the Wager. 
Numerous comments of Sober's in this lecture- not to mention the title of the 
chapter itself'-bear out this point. As the chapter proceeds, for example, Sober explains 
what a prudential reason to believe something would be like. If I promise you a million 
dollars for believing that the president is juggling candy bars right now, and tell you that 
if you do not get yourself to believe the proposition I will impale you with a 
toothbrush, you have a prudential reason to believe it. That is the sense in which you 
have a reason to believe the proposition, but of course this is not any sort of evidential 
reason. "You haven't one shred of evidence that the proposition is true. Let's describe 
this fact by saying that you don't have an evidential reason for believing the proposition 
in question."2 Sober then employs this analogy to talk about the Wager' 
Pascal's Wager is intended to provide you with a prudential reason for believing 
that Cod exists even if you think there is no evidence that there is a Cod. Even 
if you think all the evidence is against the existence of Cod, Pascal thinks he can 
give you a prudential reason for theism, so long as you grant that the existence 
of Cod is at least possible.) 
The candy bar analogy hints that Cod's likelihood is about as great as Ceorge W juggling 
Snickers. Sober seems to consider both propositions unlikely and short on evidence, and 
perhaps even propositions against which we could adduce a great deal of evidence. 
This is not be the first time Sober employs a strategic analogy with theism. Those 
familiar with his text may recall his Only Came in Town fallacy This is the fallacy of 
thinking we are obliged to accept an explanation for a particular phenomenon just 
because it is the only explanation so far proffered. At key junctures when Sober wants 
to underscore the implausibility of theism he raises the specter of this fallacy For 
instance, a few chapters before the Pascal lecture, Sober writes the following, in 
answer to the question of whether one ought to accept the theological explanation for 
patterns of reproduction in the absence of a better explanation by science: 
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Recall the anecdote from Lecture 3. If you and I are sitting in a cabin and hear 
noises in the attic, it is easy to formulate an explanation of those noises. I suggest 
the noises are due to gremlins bowling. This hypothesis has the property that if it 
were true, it would explain why we heard the noises. But this fact about the 
gremlin hypothesis doesn't mean that the hypothesis is plausible.4 
From this Sober concludes that, by parity of reasoning, we should rest content simply to 
admit that at present we do not understand pattems of reproduction. Rather than giving 
up and opting for the theological explanation, we should be patient enough to endure 
what is likely to be only temporary ignorance until science gives us the explanation. 
The implicit mutual exclusivity of theological and scientific explanations in Sober's 
analysis betrays that, contrary to Sober's claim in that chapter that evolution as he was 
construing it was neutral on the question of theism, science's success at providing 
explanations was increasingly rendering theism obsolete and explanatorily idle.s 
Perhaps on an epistemic par with bowling gremlins. Science construed as inherently at 
odds with theism would constitute what William James would have called sdentism, a 
sort of hyperfaith in science's ability to answer every imaginable question. (One thinks 
of the recent scientist who claimed to have a scientific explanation for the creation of 
the universe from nothingJ This gremlin analogy is what is most instructive here. 
Notice that a proposition about bowling gremlins is not just lacking in evidential 
support, but is a proposition against which an impressive array of evidence can be 
adduced. It is, by design, a patently silly notion. So of course if it were the only theory 
on the table, it would be rational to wait for a more acceptable alternative to come 
along. To think otherwise is to reason fallaciously. 
This elucidation of the Only Game in Town fallacy conceals an important fact. 
What makes such reasoning fallacious is not just the decision to accept the only 
theory available, but doing so when the theory in question is, at best, minimally 
supported by evidence, patently absurd at worst. Suppose we were to alter the 
analogy for a moment. Imagine that we are at the cabin and hear the noises in the 
attic. Having been there before, you surmise it is neighbor kids who you happen to 
know like to sneak in and go play in the attic. I may not know about those kids, but 
once I hear the hypothesis I would be well within my epistemic rights to infer that 
that is the best explanation, despite that it is the only explanation in the offing. That 
one accepts the only theory on the table is not automatically flawed reasoning. That I 
may not be obligated to accept it hardly entails that I am obligated to reject it. When 
the example is bowling gremlins, though, the subtle slide seems persuasive from 
permission to refrain from accepting a proposition to an obligation to reject it. That 
Sober employs an analogy between bowling gremlins and theism is a maneuver that 
many thoughtful theists would naturally resist. If Sober himself personally believes that 
theism and gremlins are on an epistemic par, that is of course his prerogative. It is 
surely not the opinion of all intelligent philosophers. For many, the plausibility of 
theism seems much greater, inclining them to display considerably more openness 
than Sober does, despite the lipservice he pays to the importance of such openness, to 
theistic explanations of phenomena not otherwise plausibly explained or explainable. 
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What Sober's penchant for epistemically uncharitable analogies with theism goes to 
show is probably Sober's own skepticism, but he needs to be careful not to project the 
appearance that Pascal himself shared such skepticism. Pascal was, of course, not 
uninfluenced by skeptical thought, but a careful reading of the Pensees makes clear that he 
hardly considered theism implausible or irrational. The notes constitutive of the Pensees 
were being compiled for the purpose of an expansive, comprehensive Christian 
apologetic. To suggest, even implicitly, that Pascal was preoccupied with the matter of 
constructing an argument to believe even if there is no evidence for God's existence 
borders the disingenuous. It is not an uncommon treatment of Pascal by philosophers 
acquainted only with his Wager, but it is a woefully inadequate and unrepresentative 
treatment of Pascal's philosophical work.6 By delimiting one's presentation of Pascal to 
two pages from the Pensees and then not disabusing the reader from believing that a mere 
inadvertent implication of the Wager constitutes Pascal's central preoccupation is just poor 
analysis. Whatever pedagogical benefits such an approach features pale in the light of the 
disservice to and skewed representation of Pascal. 
There is room for some plausible deniability by Sober on nearly all my charges 
here. He does not explicitly say that Pascal was only involved in advancing the Wager; 
he does not insist that Pascal himself believed there to be no evidence for theism 
generally or Christianity particularly. No, the lack of troublesome logical implications 
leaves room for deniability; however, Sober's implicatures are undeniable. 
Communication takes place between the lines, not just by straightforward assertion. 
For instance, later in the lecture Sober writes, "Pascal aimed to provide a prudential 
reason, not an evidential reason." Sober might insist that, contextually considered, 
such a statement clearly refers to the Wager, which is never explicitly claimed to be 
the only aspect of Pascal's writing. However, it is obvious that introductory students 
unfamiliar with Pascal would naturally take Sober's statement to mean that Pascal was 
unconcerned with evidential matters. That no primary selections from Pascal involving 
his evidential considerations are included in Sober's book lessens the likelihood that 
such misimpressions will be corrected. The number of students who heed Sober's 
bibliography at the end of the section and actually look at Pascal's words for 
themselves are probably few and far between. 
Pascal aimed to provide in the Pensees ever so many evidential reasons to believe in 
God's existence and the truth of Christianity. Among them were arguments to show 
Christianity's appeal to people in all sorts of different cultural situations and Christianity's 
ability to account for both the greatness and the wretchedness of man. Pascal took Jesus' 
miracles and fulfillment of prophecies as effective indications of the authenticity of his 
claims. Pascal also gave an argument that echoes C.S. Lewis's famous Trilemma 
argument. The way Pascal put it, it's altogether unlikely that the Apostles who attested to 
the historicity of Christ's resurrection were either deceived or deceivers. 
Despite these arguments and many others that Pascal thought could be deployed 
for arguing for the truth of Christianity, Pascal also happened to be acutely aware of 
reason's limitations. Faith for Pascal was a way of knowing that was supernaturally 
inspired. Faith was not contrary to reason, but it exceeds reason in terms of the 
certainty it is able to confer. Take the efforts of natural theology, the cosmological, 
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teleological, or ontological proofs of God's existence, for example. These philosophical 
arguments, Pascal writes, "are so far removed from man's reasoning, and so 
complicated, that they have little force. When they do help some people it is only at 
the moment when they see the demonstration. An hour later they are afraid of having 
made a mistake. '" Few theists' genuine faith is primarily rooted in such metaphysical 
proofs anyway. Moreover, it seems unlikely that God is primarily measuring people's 
philosophical acumen or argumentative prowess when he separates the sheep from 
the goats at the eschaton-as if heaven were a reward for thinking through 
implications of an S5 modal logic or the principle of sufficient reason. 
Pascal's sensitivity to reason's limitations led him once to ask whether probability 
was itself probable, a question that practically serves as a precursor to Hume's 
problem of induction. Influenced by his famous elder French contemporary, Pascal 
also saw clearly reason's inability to establish with Cartesian certainty that we are not 
dreaming right now. Pascal's use of reason enabled him to identify reason's limitations, 
which naturally led him to infer that reason is not everything. That reason is not 
everything, however, hardly entails that reason is nothing, or that Pascal can rightly be 
taken as a paradigmatic irrationalist. That Pascal was no strong rationalist does not 
mean he was a fideist. That he was not Aquinas did not make him Tertullian. Pascal's 
sometimes cryptic and obscurantist way of expressing his thoughts in what has to be 
remembered were the notes of the Pensees, if exploited and removed from context, 
can make it seem like he was denying reason altogether. A fair reading reveals this 
simply was not the case. He characterized as an excess not only "allowing only 
reason," but also" excluding reason."s "Reason's last step is to recognize that there is an 
infinite number of things which surpass it. It is simply feeble if it does not go as far as 
realizing that."9 Pascal could sense reason's inability to confer Cartesian certainty, 
induction's inability to be noncircularly established, and that imagination sometimes 
dwarfed even the most solidly grounded reason. Reason was important for Pascal, but 
it could fail to provide even the most basic answers to our questions, and "if natural 
things surpass it, what will we say about supernatural things7" IO 
So the suggestion that Pascal's Wager, taken in isolation, can adequately summarize 
Pascal is simply farfetched. Justice can not even be done to the Wager itself when it is 
taken in isolation. Doing so invariably tempts the reader of Pascal to interpret the Wager 
in the crassest of fashions. Deploying his insights as a mathematician, Pascal had the 
insight that there was an infinity and eternity to lose if we did not align our lives correctly 
to the ultimate reality. As Sober puts it with maximal crassness, if "you don't believe there 
is a God," and there is one, "Pascal says you suffer an infinite punishment- you receive 
eternal damnation."11 Surely the potential loss of an infinite good of an ethically promising 
kind is a relevant consideration for someone who might be genuinely teetering between 
alternatives like theism and atheism and if, as Pascal suggests, reason alone is insufficient 
to conclusively settle the matter evidentially. God's existence and whether or not this life 
is all there is makes a huge difference to the way we ought to live and do our philosophy. 
As Pascal wrote, "There can be no doubt that whether the soul is mortal or immortal 
ought to make the whole difference in ethics. And yet philosophers have drawn up their 
ethics independently of this!"l2 He adds the following: 
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The immortality of the soul is something of such vital importance to us, which 
affects us so deeply, that we would have to have lost all feeling in order to be 
indifferent to the truth about it. All our actions and thoughts must fo llow such 
different paths, according to whether there are ete rnal blessings to hope for o r 
no t, that it is impossible to take a step sensibly and discerningly except by 
determining it with this point in mind, which ought to be our ultimate aim." 
It is no t that Pasca l thought theism was unlike ly but we had be tte r cover o ur 
cosmic rear ends anyway, but rather that theism was likely true and that it had 
remarkable implications tha t need to be seriously reckoned with. His point about 
reason's inability to settle the matter is not that the ism is obj ectively unlikely o r 
evidentially unsupported, but that our decision on this matter is less a matter of being 
rigid and strict evidentialists and more a matte r of responding to an invitation to a 
re latio nship. Lovers do no t issue ca ll s to be lieve in the ir existence and be good 
evidentialists, but rather to enter into a holistically intimate relationship by wooing 
their beloved's heart and mind both. The principled reason, Pascal seems to suggest, 
that Cod does not overwhelm our intellect with light o r coerce our will by flooding us 
with undeniable evidence is that he wants to gently woo our hearts and appeal to 
more than merely our intellect. "Cod wants to motivate the will more than the mind. 
Absolute clarity would be more use to the mind and would not help the will."" The 
suggestion that Pasca l himself would insist that m ere propositional be lief in Cod's 
existence suffices to enter into the blessedness of heaven is radica lly mistaken. Pasca l's 
accoun t of reason's limitations has everything to do with Cod's wooing us more 
ho listi cally than merely in te rms of our coming to assent to his bare existence. 
Pascal argues time and aga in that there is enough evidence to make religious belief 
rational, but no t enough to make it impossible. "There is enough light fo r those w ho 
des ire to see, and enough darkness for those of a contrary disposition."" "There is 
enough light to enlighten the e lect and enough darkness to humble them. There is 
enough darkness to blind the damned and enough light to condemn them and leave 
them witho ut excuses."'6 Sober's emaciated trea tme nt of Pasca l gravitates to the 
peripheral and eschews the central and ineliminable. It is important to let Pasca l speak 
fo r himself 
The prophecies, even the miracles and proofs of our religion, are not of such a 
nature that they can be said to be absolutely convincing, but they are also such 
that it cannot be sa id unreasonable to believe them. So there is evidence and 
obscurity, to enlighten some and· obscure the others. But the evidence is such 
that it exceeds, o r at least equals, the evidence to the contrary, so that it cannot 
be reaso n w hi ch d ec id es us no t to fo ll o w it. Th e re fore it can o nl y b e 
concupiscence and wickedness of heart. 
N OTES 
I . William James, commenting on the Wager similarly construed in hi s famous essay 
'The Will to Believe," wrote, "You probably feel that when religious fa ith expresses itself thus, in 
the language of the gaming-table, it is put to its last trumps. Surely Pascal's own personal belief 
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in masses and holy water had far other springs; and this celebrated page of his is but an 
argument for others, a last desperate snatch at a weapon against the hardness of the unbelieving 
heart. We feel that a faith in masses and holy water adopted willfully after such a mechanical 
calculation would lack the inner soul of faith 's reality; and if we were ourselves in the place of 
the Deity, we should probably take particular pleasure in cutting off believers of this pattern 
from their infinite reward." James went on to argue that the only way for the Wager to have 
any pull is for the option in question to have some pull on us already, that is, to be a live 
option. Despite the appearance of disagreement with Pascal, James eventually demonstrated 
important points of resonance with Pascal, such as recognizing the importance of willfully 
choosing between important options when the evidential case is not decisive and in recognizing 
that what is at stake where religion is concerned is a potential relationship, carrying with it its 
own logic. C.S. Lewis, in "On Obstinacy of Belief," would echo these very themes as well. 
2. Eliott Sober, Core Questions in Philosophy: A Text with Readings, 3rd ed. (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 200 I ), p. 98. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., p. 75. 
5. This is increasingly common among secular philosophers who treat theism as an 
hypothesis that must provide the best explanation of various phenomena if we are to be 
rational in believing it. Although theism can plausibly be argued to provide such explanations, a 
fair number of Christian philosophers have rightly pointed out that theism is not rightly thought 
of as akin to a scientific theory designed to explain the world. 
6. Pascal's philosophical contributions have also been trivialized by those who resent his 
having left behind his mathematical pursuits to do religious philosophy. As E.T. Bell writes, in 
Men of Mathematics, " .. . we shall consider Pascal primarily as a highly gifted mathematician who 
let his masochistic proclivities for self-torturing and profitless speculations on the sectarian 
controversies of his day degrade him to what would now be called a religious neurotic." I am 
rather inclined to think that much of the same genius that led to his mathematical achievement 
inspired his philosophical insight. 
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question of what it would take to convince him of a miracle, he cited a sort of miracle so 
undeniable that nobody in their right mind could deny it. Pascal would challenge Flew to 
consider that God might have principled reasons not to so radically illumine the mind with 
revelation and thereby effectively coerce the will. 
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